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introduction
The righT To a judicial deTerminaTion of The lawfulness of a person’s deTenTion, commonly known as The righT To habeas corpus, provides an essential safeguard against 
unlawful deprivation of personal liberty. From its origins in 
medieval England, habeas corpus spread to diverse corners of 
the globe as part of English common law and its influence on 
other legal systems. Functioning as a check on a government’s 
ability to imprison an individual, habeas corpus has earned an 
almost mythical status as a bulwark of liberty, and serves as a 
cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
The availability and scope of habeas corpus has assumed 
a renewed importance in the post-September 11th world. The 
right has been invoked in response to aggressive state detention 
practices employed against suspected terrorists and others. In 
particular, the extent of the right to habeas corpus has been a 
central issue in the controversy surrounding the United States’ 
detention of “enemy combatants” at the Guantánamo Bay naval 
facility in Cuba. Thus far, habeas corpus has provided the only 
meaningful legal mechanism challenging the legal basis for 
holding these detainees.
The reach of habeas corpus, however, is sometimes limited 
under domestic law. The U.S. Congress’s 2006 attempt to strip 
courts’ jurisdiction to hear Guantánamo detainees’ habeas cor-
pus petitions without providing a suitable substitute underscores 
the importance of habeas corpus guarantees in international 
human rights instruments.1 The sixtieth anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides a fit-
ting opportunity to explore the extent to which that instrument 
guarantees the right to habeas corpus. 
draFtinG the uniVerSal declaration oF  
human riGhtS
In early 1947, less than a year after the first session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, the newly-created Human 
Rights Commission (the Commission) met for the first time to 
begin work on an “International Bill of Human Rights,” which 
would include both a non-binding declaration of human rights 
and a binding convention. To aid in its work, the Commission 
requested that the UN Secretariat create an outline of rights for 
it to consider as it began its task. The right to habeas corpus 
was one of the forty-eight items included in the Secretariat’s 
outline.2 
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Having given priority to drafting the non-binding declara-
tion, which could be adopted by resolution of the General 
Assembly, the Commission’s drafting committee began con-
sidering which rights were suitable for inclusion. Initially, the 
committee elected to include the right to habeas corpus in an 
article guaranteeing liberty of the person. Closely modeled on 
the habeas corpus language in the American Law Institute’s 
1945 Statement of Essential Human Rights, the committee’s 
provision stated that “[e]very one placed under arrest or deten-
tion shall have the right to immediate judicial determination of 
the legality of any detention to which he may be subject.” 3
As the drafting process continued, however, members of the 
committee suggested incorporating additional rights into the 
draft declaration. As part of this process, the rights to a speedy 
trial and to release on bail were tacked on to the end of the 
habeas corpus provision.4 The article that emerged contained 
three distinct categories of rights: the right to liberty of person, 
the right to habeas corpus, and fair trial rights applicable to 
criminal proceedings. 
By the time the committee unveiled this wide-ranging article, 
however, a shift had occurred in the Commission regarding the 
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corpus article conflicted with an emerging preference among 
many members of the Commission to produce a shorter declara-
tion less concerned with specifics. In the words of one repre-
sentative, “the Declaration should lay down principles and not 
become involved with details.”5 In June 1948, the Commission 
voted to approve a revised draft of the entire UDHR that con-
tained less detailed articles. The article that contained the right to 
habeas corpus was rewritten to reflect the general principle that 
“[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” 6 
This streamlined version of the draft declaration was for-
warded via the Economic and Social Council to the Third 
Committee of the General Assembly. There, the lack of a habeas 
corpus provision did not go unnoticed, and the omission caused 
concern in the minds of many delegates. While the reinstatement 
of the specific right was rejected as being incompatible with a 
view of the UDHR as a brief statement of general principles, the 
absence of any remedial provisions was equally unacceptable. 
Eventually, the Third Committee voted to add a broad 
remedial provision proposed by Mexico and based on the 
Latin American concept of amparo. This new language, added 
as Article 8, guaranteed that “[e]veryone has the right to an 
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted to him by the constitu-
tion or law.”7 This provision was forwarded to the full General 
Assembly for inclusion in the UDHR, approved 10 December 
1948. 
the relationShip BetWeen AmpAro and  
haBeaS corpuS
Although the final version of the UDHR did not contain an 
explicit reference to habeas corpus, one reading of the document 
is that the addition of amparo in Article 8 in effect implicitly 
restored the right. The remedies of amparo and habeas corpus 
are closely related. While habeas corpus developed in English 
law exclusively as a means of challenging an unlawful deten-
tion, amparo developed more recently across Latin America as 
a broad mechanism available to remedy the violation of any fun-
damental rights, including those of personal liberty. Influenced 
by the Spanish remedy of manifestación de las personas, the 
United States concept of judicial review, and Anglo-American 
habeas corpus, amparo originated in nineteenth-century Mexico 
and spread in various forms across Central and South America.
As amparo spread, national judicial systems throughout 
Latin America adopted procedures for determining the legality 
of a person’s detention under models that incorporated elements 
of both habeas corpus and amparo. In Mexico, and later in 
Chile, a remedy known as amparo de la libertad evolved as one 
of several specific versions of the writ of amparo. In Venezuela, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua, no such specialized version existed, 
and challenges to detention occurred under the general remedy 
of amparo. On the other hand, the writ of habeas corpus was 
adopted as the exclusive means of determining the lawfulness 
of detention in Argentina, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa 
Rica, Panama, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil, while the general 
remedy of amparo remained available to vindicate all other 
constitutional rights.8  
In essence, habeas corpus and amparo coexisted in many of 
these countries, with habeas corpus used as the specific remedy 
for unlawful detention and amparo available for all other viola-
tions of fundamental rights. In countries where habeas corpus 
did not exist as a separate remedy, its function was incorporated 
into general or specific versions of amparo. 
In its final version, Article 8 of the UDHR includes a broadly 
stated remedy, equivalent to the general remedy of amparo. 
Given the absence of a separate habeas corpus provision, the 
general remedy of amparo can be understood to include the 
right to a determination of the legality of a person’s detention, 
so long as national law contains a prohibition against arbitrary 
and unlawful detention. 
doeS article 8 proVide an adeQuate remedy For 
unlaWFul detention?
While the Article 8 amparo provision in the UDHR allows 
for a general judicial remedy for violations of national constitu-
tions or laws, does this truly fill the void left by removing a spe-
cific habeas corpus provision? Habeas corpus has evolved into 
a highly specialized and distinct right with particular connota-
Although the final version 
of the UDHR did not 
contain an explicit reference 
to habeas corpus, one 
reading of the document is 
that the addition of amparo 
in Article 8 in effect 
implicitly restored the right.
tions. The Commission was aware of this, as habeas corpus was 
the only remedy of a specific nature included in the Secretariat’s 
outline of possible rights for inclusion in the UDHR. Its removal 
was a conscious decision by the Commission, as was the Third 
Committee’s decision not to restore a specific habeas corpus 
article. 
These factors might suggest that Article 8 was not intended 
to include the right to habeas corpus. In addition, Article 8 
only provides a remedy for violations of national law. The 
Commission’s draft habeas corpus provision, on the other hand, 
might have been interpreted to require that a remedy be made 
available for violations of personal liberty as defined by the 
UDHR itself, and not only those that violated national law. In 
this way, the article would have provided wider protection in 
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situations where national law permitted detention that might be 
considered unlawful or arbitrary by international standards.
At the same time, the Commission’s draft habeas corpus 
provision lacked any reference to one of the basic elements of 
habeas corpus in the Anglo-American tradition: the authority of 
the court to order a person’s release if detention is determined 
specific rights, but as a statement of general principles. The 
subsequent removal of the specific right to habeas corpus must 
be viewed through the same lens. The removal of the right was 
therefore not a rejection of the concept of habeas corpus, but part 
of conscious decision by the drafters to make the UDHR a less 
detailed and more idealized affirmation of human rights.
Even in this environment, however, the omission of habeas 
corpus did not go unnoticed, and was the impetus for the addi-
tion of the broader amparo provision in the Third Committee. It 
is significant that the addition of this provision was spearheaded 
by representatives from Latin American countries who would 
have understood the concept of amparo to implicitly include 
the right to habeas corpus in the absence of a separate, specific 
statement of that right. Certainly, the text of Article 8 is broad 
enough to guarantee a remedy for violation of the right to lib-
erty. In this context, Article 8 should be read as encompassing 
the right to habeas corpus.
haBeaS corpuS in the international coVenant on 
ciVil and political riGhtS
During the Commission’s early sessions, it was decided that 
its goal of creating an “International Bill of Human Rights” 
would be best achieved by drafting both a non-binding declara-
tion and a binding convention to be ratified by UN member-
states. One result of this decision was the emergence of the view 
among delegates that the UDHR should reflect broad principles 
while the convention should provide a detailed list of specific 
rights. As described above, the removal of an explicit right to 
habeas corpus from the UDHR was primarily a result of this 
view. Examining the treatment of the right to habeas corpus 
in the corresponding binding convention, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), provides addi-
tional context for assessing the extent to which Article 8 of the 
UDHR may implicitly guarantee the right. 
From the start, the right to habeas corpus was included 
among the enumerated provisions of the ICCPR. The earliest 
drafts actually contained language guaranteeing a “remedy in 
the nature of ‘habeas corpus.’”9 This language was amended, 
however, to provide a more universal description of the right. By 
1952, the habeas corpus article was essentially in its final form.
The ICCPR’s adoption and ratification would, of course, take 
many more years. The General Assembly adopted the covenant 
The U.S. Congress’s 2006 attempt to strip courts’ 
jurisdiction to hear Guantánamo detainees’ habeas 
corpus petitions without providing a suitable substitute 
underscores the importance of habeas corpus guarantees 
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to be unlawful. As written, the Commission’s draft only pro-
vided for “judicial determination of the legality” of detention. 
By omitting this key element, the draft article would have either 
provided an ineffectual remedy, or it would have had to be read 
only as a general requirement to make habeas corpus available 
as opposed to a detailed procedural rule.
The latter reading, of course, is consistent with the draft-
ers’ decision to frame the UDHR not as an enumerated list of 
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in 1966 and it took effect in 1976 upon ratification by the thirty-
fifth state-party. ICCPR Article 9(4) contained an unambiguous 
guarantee to habeas corpus, stating:
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or 
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before 
a court, in order that that court may decide without 
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his 
release if the detention is not lawful.10
Including a specific habeas corpus article in the ICCPR 
lends weight to the argument that UDHR Article 8 encompasses 
a right to habeas corpus. Moreover, it vindicates removing the 
habeas corpus provision from the UDHR by highlighting the 
provision’s shortcomings. Unlike the draft provision considered 
for the UDHR, Article 9(4) of the ICCPR specifically mandates 
that courts be empowered to order the release of a person it finds 
to be unlawfully detained.
concluSion
Analyzing the drafting history of the UDHR and the back-
ground of the amparo provision, it is evident that Article 8 
should be read to guarantee the availability of habeas corpus as a 
remedy against the violation of the fundamental right to personal 
liberty. The enumeration of a specific habeas corpus right in the 
ICCPR affirms the view that the UDHR implicitly guaranteed 
the right while also providing an express statement of the right 
in a binding instrument. 
The right to habeas corpus has assumed an enhanced 
importance in recent years due to practices employed in the 
fight against terrorism. Its existence in the UDHR and other 
international human rights instruments is significant given both 
the UDHR’s moral and political weight and the influence these 
instruments have in developing national law. HRB
